Abstract: I provide a positive expressivist account of the permissibility of 'standing one's ground' in some cases of moral conflict, based in part on an illustrative analogy with political disputes. This account suffices to undermine Enoch's recent argument against expressivism.
Begin with (2). This premise is understood by Enoch to be an existentially quantified proposition, stating merely that in some moral conflicts, someone standing their ground is permissible (26). Enoch supports this premise by reflecting on Experiment, where …it seems intuitively clear that you are justified in standing your ground, making sure that we don't proceed in the way that will subject the dog to serious pain. (23) I share Enoch's intuition and thus accept (2).
That leaves (1). Given the understanding of (2), to secure validity this must be understood as the claim that if expressivism is true it is never permissible to stand one's ground (in the relevant cases). Enoch does not define expressivism explicitly, but it is common enough to take it as the view that moral judgements express a particular type of non-cognitive attitude rather than moral beliefs. Like Enoch, I take Blackburn (1984; 1998) to be a paradigm expressivist.
First Argument for (1)
Why accept (1) This argument fails because (1c) is false. To see this, it is necessary to distinguish two explananda which Enoch runs together: moral judgements (such as my judgement that eating meat is permissible) and moral truths (such as the truth that cruelty is wrong). According to expressivism, in order to explain the first, all that is required is a naturalistic view of the world as containing natural properties, agents and their responses. As Blackburn puts it: 'The only things in this world are the attitudes of people and those, of course, are trivially and harmlessly mind-dependent ' (1993: 174) . But expressivists explicitly deny that the second explananda -moral truths -are explained by (or dependent upon) our emotions or reactions in the same way. Blackburn again:
It is because of our responses that we say that cruelty is wrong, but it is not because of them that it is so…our actual responses are inappropriate anchors for the wrongness of cruelty. What makes cruelty abhorrent is not that it offends us, but all those hideous things that make it so. (1993: 172; cf. 1984: 217 and 1998: 296.) Of course, Enoch might reply, it is one thing for an expressivist to say such things, another to show that doing so is consistent with expressivism. Enoch's underlying suspicion is that the explanatory priority expressivism gives to our emotions and reactions when explaining moral judgement suffices to show expressivism to be committed to the same explanatory priority when it comes to explaining moral truths.
5 To rebut this suspicion, the expressivist needs show how she can assert the claim: 'What explains moral truths is not something about my emotions and reactions' whilst still committing to expressivism. In so doing, she will show how one can accept the antecedent but not the consequent of (1c).
That the expressivist can assert such claims is not news. The standard account has three steps (see Blackburn 1981: 179-80; 1993: 4, 172-8; 1984: 218-9; Sinclair 2008) . First, the relevant claim of explanation or dependency is stripped of any supposed metaethical (specifically, realist) commitments. So rather than understanding the claim here as the view that there are robust moral properties (such as the realist believes in) whose distribution is not explained by our reactive tendencies, we understand it as the claim that the correct application of (attitude-expressing) moral predicates is not explained by (dependent upon) our reactive tendencies. Second, such claims are given an 'internal reading', that is, they are understood as substantive moral positions. In this case, we understand the claim as stating that the correct application of moral predicates should not be taken to be explained by (depend upon) our reactive tendencies. Third and finally, the expressivist
